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The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact 
Statement Requirement 
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEP A)1 in response to the growing public concern about present 
and potential environmental problems. The Act was intended "[t]o 
declare a national policy which [ would] encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which [ would] prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; 
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural re-
sources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality."2 Section 102(2),3 the "action forcing''4 
provision of NEPA, requires all federal agencies to implement cer-
tain procedures in their decision-making process. The environmen-
tal impact statement requirement of section 102(2)(C) is the most 
significant of these procedures and has been the basis of most NEPA 
litigation. 5 Section 102 directs that "to the fullest extent possible 
. . . (2) all agencies of the Federal government shall . . . (C) 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
2. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). 
3. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2) (1970). 
4. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs., 470 F.2d 289, 297-98 (8th Cir. 1972); Anderson, 
The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVmONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE, 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 239 (1974). 
5. Courts have construed section 102(2) (C) to be sufficiently specific to be the 
basis of a cause of action, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN TIIE COURTS 15-23 (1973), 
and have been very liberal in granting standing, see id. at 26-44. See generally 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973). 
In a suit against a federal agency acting abroad, there are several possible theories 
upon which standing might be based. First, a United States plaintiff could argue that 
he has in some way directly suffered injury in fact due to a federal action abroad. Cf. 
Sierra Club v. Coleman, Civ. No. 75-1040, mem. at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1975). 
Second, a plaintiff could argue that he has a right under NEPA to be informed by, 
and be able to comment on, impact statements on federal action anywhere. Cf. 
Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087 n.29 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). Finally, there is support for the proposition that NEPA gives foreigners 
who would suffer "injury in fact" a right to sue. See Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 463 
F.2d 1261 (1972) (Canadian citizen and Canadian environmental group allowed to 
intervene in NEPA action); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 820 n.14 
(D. Hawaii 1973) (granting standing to nonresident aliens living in U.S. trust 
territory). 
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responsible official on [the environmental impact and other environ-
mental considerations of the proposed action]."6 
Although it is clear that section 102(2) applies to federal activi-
ties within the United States, several agencies have argued that 
NEPA does not apply to their international activities. While 
some have subsequently promulgated regulations that do not exempt 
these international activities from NEPA's procedures, 7 at least four 
agencies that are involved in extensive activities abroad wit•h great 
potential for environmental impact-the Defense Department, the 
Agency for International Development (AID), the Export-Import 
Bank (Eximbank), and the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC)-refuse to comply with the requirements of section 
102(2)(C) with regard to their international activities. 8 To date, 
6. The complete list of the matters on which the impact statement is to comment 
is as follows: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and 
the maintenance and enhancement of Jong-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would 
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(1970). Section 102(2)(C) continues: 
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall con-
sult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction 
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. 
Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Fed-
eral, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce en-
vironmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on 
Environmental Quality and to the public . . . , and shall accompany the pro-
posal through the existing agency review processes. 
7. Agencies that have apparently acquiesced in the application of NEPA pro-
cedures to activities outside the United States include the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, see 38 Fed. Reg. 6321 (1973), the Coast Guard, see 38 Fed. Reg. 
34,135-46 (1973), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, see 14 C.F.R. 
§ 1204.1103 (1975), and the Department of State, see 37 Fed. Reg. 19,167-68 (1972). 
The State Department position, however, is not shared by the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID), an independent agency within the State Department. 
8. "For major significant Defense actions conducted in, or partly in, areas which 
are in or under the jurisdiction of a nation other than the United States," the Defense 
Department requires the responsible unit to provide the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense "with a recommendation as to whether or not a statement should bo 
prepared, reasons for the recommendation, and an evaluation of the effect of a 
statement on U.S. foreign relations." 32 C.F.R. § 214.6(b)(1) (1975). Although 
the standards to be used in this recommendation are not articulated, the regulation 
appears to leave room for discretionary decisions to omit the preparation of NEPA 
impact statements in situations in which the proper functioning of the Department is 
not so irreconcilably in conflict with NEPA procedural requirements as to mandate 
an exception to those requirements. Compare text at and following note 141. By 
contrast, the regulations originally proposed by the Department did not confer such 
discretion. They stated that, except for combat or combat-related activities, "environ-
mental statements are required for actions [of environmental significance] conducted 
anywhere in the world, if they are major and significant." 38 Fed. Reg. 31,647 
(1972). 
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no court has directly confronted the issue of the applicability of 
NEPA procedures to the international activities of these and other 
federal agencies. 9 · 
AID is an independent agency within the Department of State established to 
provide assistance to developing countries in the form of capital projects and technical 
assistance. In addition to assisting in land alteration and industrial development 
projects, AID finances agricultural activities involving pesticides, chemical fertilizers, 
fungicides, and herbicides that have potential for serious environmental side effects. It 
has been argued on behalf of AID that NEPA does not apply to actions occurring 
within the territorial jurisdiction of another state. See Administration of the Nation-
al Environmental Policy Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 546 (1970) (memorandum of C. Herter, Special Assistant to 
the Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]. 
Although AID is aware of the need for environmental protection, and has since 
adopted internal procedures requiring consideration of environmental factors in order 
"[t]o implement A.I.D.'s policy to conform with the intent and objectives of 
[NEPA]," 37 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1972), the procedures do not fully satisfy NEPA 
requirements. There is no provision for the preparation and distribution of a draft 
environmental impact statement for comment by other agencies and the public. 
Instead, only the release of a final impact statement at a late stage in the decision-
making process is required. 
Eximbank is primarily involved with providing financing for foreign borrowers 
wishing to purchase American goods, including nuclear power plants, oil rigs, and 
other equipment with the potential for significantly altering the environment. Not-
withstanding these dangers, Eximbank has no environmental regulations and main-
tains that it is exempt from NEPA. See Eximbank's Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-11, Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENv. L. REP. 20,685 
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) [hereinafter Eximbank's Opposition]. 
OPIC is a federally owned corporation that insures and guarantees foreign 
investments. Although OPIC has adopted environmental guidelines that provide for 
the evaluation of environmental effects of OPIC-supported projects, the applicant, not 
the agency, prepares the impact statement, and there is no provision for review by 
other agencies or the public. See Overseas Private Investment Corp., General Policy 
and Guidelines, Eligibility of Projects, Environmental Considerations, No. 5.101, Oct. 
26, 1971. 
9. In Sierra Club v. Coleman, Civ. No. 75-1040 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 1975), a 
preliminary injunction was issued against the Department of Transportation and the 
Federal Highway Administration. Because of their failure to comply fully with the 
procedural requirements of NEPA, these agencies were prohibited from further 
participation in the construction of the Darien Gap Highway in Panama and 
Colombia. However, in granting the injunction, the court did not discuss whether 
NEPA applies to the extraterritorial activities of federal agencies because the defend-
ants did not maintain that their activities were exempt from NEPA. Rather, they 
contended that their environmental assessments satisfied the procedural requirements 
of the Act. 
In People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973), NEPA was 
construed to apply to Trust Territories of the United States-broader questions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction were not reached. See text at notes 110-15 infra. The 
issue whether NEPA applies to federal activities abroad was more directly raised in 
Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENv. L. REP. 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974), in which 
plaintiffs requested the AEC, the Department of State, and Eximbank to prepare an 
impact statement with regard to the nuclear power plant export program. Prior to 
judgment, however, the AEC (now ERDA) agreed to prepare an impact statement, 
and the court declined to rule on the applicability of NEPA to Eximbank. Signifi-
cantly, however, ERDA's draft impact statement, see Comment, International Appli-
cation of NEPA: Environmentalists Challenge Pesticide Aid Program, 5 ENv. L. REP. 
10,086 (1975), and decision to continue nuclear power export activities during the 
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This Note analyzes the extent to which NEPA's section 102(2) 
procedural requirements, specifically the impact statement require-
ment of section 102(2) (C), apply to federal agencies in their activi-
ties abroad. After determining that Congress does possess the 
authority to extend the requirements of NEPA to all federal agency 
actions, and that legislative intent will thus control the territorial 
scope of these requirements, consideration will be given to the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of congressional 
enactments. It will be concluded that a "clear statement" of con-
gressional intent is not required in the case of NEPA and that the 
scope of the Act should be determined by considering all relevant 
manifestations of congressional intent. This Note will therefore 
analyze NEPA's language and legislative history and the policy con-
siderations relevant to extraterritorial application of the impact state-
ment requirement and, on the basis of this analysis, conclude that 
the NEPA procedural requirements apply to federal activities any-
where in the world. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
In determining the territorial scope of NEPA's procedural 
requirements, the threshold issue that must be confronted is the ex-
tent of congressional authority. The first consideration is whether 
international law would restrict congressional power.10 In Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co.,11 in which a United States trademark infringe-
ment act was extended to a United States citizen in Mexico, the 
S~preme Court articulated the general rule: "'[T]he United States 
is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the 
conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign 
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not 
infringed.' "12 NEPA procedures are directed only to federal agen-
cies and would not affect actions taken by either foreign nations or 
their citizens. Moreover, neither the denial of United States assist-
ance nor the imposition of conditions on assistance would appear to 
be an infringement upon foreign sovereignty. i:i Thus, no violation 
period of preparation of the final impact statement, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,463-64 (1975), 
considered only the adverse environmental impacts in the United States and on the 
high seas. Both failed to address the environmental impacts within other countries. 
Recently, several environmental organizations have sought to require an analysis of 
the supply of pesticides by AID to foreign countries. Environmental Defense Fund v. 
AID, Civ. No. 75-0500 (D.D.C., filed April 8, 1975), discussed in Comment, supra. 
10. In one sense, international law cannot "restrict" congressional authority: Even 
if Congress legislates beyond its international "authority," United States courts would 
enforce such laws. See text at note 26 infra. 
11. 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
12. 344 U.S. at 285-86, quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941). 
13. The NEPA procedures will often have the effect of imposing some burdens 
(gathering and providing information is an obvious example) on other parties 
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of established principles of international law would result from the 
application of NEPA's procedural requirements to the international 
activities of federal agencies. 
A second factor that could limit congressional authority to apply 
NEPA's procedures to activities abroad is the possibility of an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the foreign-policy power of the executive 
branch. The extent of congressional power in the foreign-policy 
field remains an open question. The views range from exclusive 
executive power to determine foreign policy14 to recognition of con-
current power in Congress.15 However, even proponents of the for-
mer view recognize that Congress possesses substantial authority 
over the operating procedures of federal agencies abroad.16 Thi§ 
recognition probably results from the fact that such matters directly 
concern only the agencies themselves and are not really foreign-
policy determinations at all. 
Section 102(2)'s procedural requirements clearly fall within the 
bounds of this congressional authority. Although agencies must 
comply with this section "to the fullest extent possible," the section 
is clearly procedural; it does not require that particular substantive 
decisions be reached.17 Even section 102(2)(C) requires only a 
detailed investigation and report on, and a good faith consideration 
of, possible environmental impacts.18 These procedures could only 
influence foreign policy by ensuring_ that environmental factors rele-
involved in a project if an adequate impact statement is to be prepared. However, 
these burdens are often mere conditions on American assistance or cooperation; 
foreign nations and their nationals may freely choose to facilitate preparation of the 
impact statement or to refuse, with the result that, in some cases, they may lose 
American aid or cooperation. However, "this country may properly impose con-
ditions upon the granting of unilateral aid to any country, and if it chooses to 
consider environmental implications in the definition of these conditions, no one can 
legitimately object to them." H.R. REP. No. 92-316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971). 
14. See, e.g., Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Power over 
Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 320-22. 
15. See generally Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972). 
16. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 14, at 305-08. 
17. The only section 102(2) procedure that could arguably be a substantive 
foreign-policy directive is section 102(2) (E), which directs agencies to support 
international cooperation toward environmental protection where consistent with 
United States foreign policy. Because of the qualification, however, the section could 
not infringe on executive foreign-policy power. 
Of course, to the extent section 102(1) requires agencies to act in accordance with 
the declaration of policy set forth in section 101, section 102 can be seen as having 
substantive content. See Note, Tlze Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substan-
tive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REv. 735, 739 (1975). Even so, it is at least 
clear that section 102 has no substantive content independent of section 101. See 
generally Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
18. See generally Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1113-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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vant to federal activities abroad are fully considered.10 Surely this 
would not constitute an unconstitutional infringement upon the 
foreign-policy power of the executive branch. 
It is possible that the foreign-policy power of the executive 
could preclude a similar territorial extension of the substantive 
environmental policy of NEPA as articulated in section 101.20 
NEPA has been interpreted to require that the ultimate agency deci-
sion not be in arbitrary and capricious disregard of environmental 
considerations. 21 Although this test allows substantial agency discre-
tion, it creates the potential for interference with the executive for-
eign-policy power if the section 101 statement of policy is interpreted 
as applying to federal agencies worldwide. However, because 
section lOl(b) is qualified by the phrase "consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy," and since it seems cer-
tain that an executive foreign-policy determination would be in-
cluded in this category, agency decisions based on foreign-policy 
considerations would never be found to be in arbitrary and capricious 
disregard of the section lOl(b) policy declaration, as courts would 
be loath to second-guess foreign-policy judgments. Thus even the 
substantive mandate of NEPA would not interfere with foreign-
policy decisions. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Since Congress has the authority to extend NEPA to the extrater-
ritorial actions of federal agencies, congressional intent will be 
determinative of the Act's scope. Generally, legislative intent must 
be ascertained by an examination of several factors, including statu-
tory language, legislative history, and the policies underlying the act 
in question. There is, however, a well-established canon of statu-
tory construction that, in the absence of clear statutory language or 
legislative history, congressional enactments should be presumed not 
to have extraterritorial application. 22 Thus, it has been argued that 
19. It has been argued that the application of NEPA procedures to federal 
agencies abroad would necessarily have a more direct influence on foreign policy 
because the procedures would cause a material disruption in international negotia-
tions. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of Defend-
ant Export-Import Bank of The United States for Summary Judgment at 20-22, Sierra 
Club v. AEC, 4 ENV. L. REP. 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) [hereinafter Eximbank 
Memorandum]. For evaluation of this argument, see text at notes 126-41 infra. 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). It is not settled whether NEPA contains a 
substantive mandate or is merely procedural, although the trend is clearly toward 
inferring a substantive mandate. See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 736-40. 
21. See Environmental Defense Fund v. COfPS of Engrs., 470 F.2d 289, 297-300 
(8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113-
15 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
22. "Rules of United States statutory law . . . apply only to conduct occurring 
within, or having effect within the territory of the United States, unless the contrary 
is clearly indicated by the statute." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TI-IE FOREIGN 
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Congress should be presumed to have intended NEPA to be limited 
to the United States since neither the statutory language nor the 
legislative history clearly require extraterritorial application of the 
section 102(2) procedures.23 
The presumption against extraterritoriality derives from judicial 
recognition of two considerations: First, Congress is primarily con-
cerned with domestic conditions and therefore probably intends 
legislation to apply only within the United States. 24 Second, Con-
gress does not ordinarily intend to enact laws that contravene basic 
concepts of international law.25 
A review of the numerous cases that -have considered the issue 
of extraterritorial application of federal laws demonstrates that it is 
the second consideration upon which the courts focus. It is clear 
that, notwithstanding the constraints of international law, once a court 
determines that Congress intended a statute to have extraterritorial 
application, it "would be bound to follow Congressional direction 
unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment."26 Thus, where extraterritorial application of a federal act 
would transgress accepted principles of international law, courts 
apply the presumption and will not infer congressional intent to ex-
tend the scope of the statute unless such intent is clearly indicated. 21 
An example is the early case of American Banana Co. v. United 
States Fruit Co., 28 in which an alleged violation of United States anti-
trust laws was based upon the acts of a foreign government within 
its own territory. There, the Supreme Court refused, in the absence 
of a clear statement of extraterritorial scope, to infer congressional 
intent to extend the statutes to such conduct because enforcement 
would have interfered with the exercise of foreign sovereignty. 
Similarly, in Foley Bros. v. Filardo,20 the Court refused to give extra-
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT.ED STATES § 38 (1965). The Restatement's explicit 
exception to the rule that extraterritorial applicability be clearly expressed parallels a 
principle of international law that is well-recognized: "[I]t is settled law ... that 
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for 
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends •... " United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 
(2d Cir. 1945). There is no apparent reason why extraterritorial application need be 
"clearly indicated" in other instances in which such application would not contravene 
any principle of international law. See text following note 33 infra. 
23. See, e.g., Eximbank Memorandum, supra note 19, at 29-30. 
24. ~ee Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
25. See Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 
336 U.S. 281, 292 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
26. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d 
Cir. 1972) (dictum). 
27. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 
(2d Cir. 1972). 
28. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
29. 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
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territorial effect to the Eight Hour Law, a labor statute applying to 
"[e]very contract made to which the United States . . . is a party."30 
Recognizing that extraterritorial application of the statute would have 
"extend[ed] its coverage beyond places over which the United 
States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control,"31 
the court stated: "An intention so to regulate labor conditions which 
are the primary concern of a foreign country should not be attributed 
to Congress in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose."32 Sig-
nificantly, although the Court applied the presumption against extra-
territorial application, in ascertaining whether Congress had clearly 
intended such an extension, it examined not only the statutory lan-
guage, but also the statute's legislative history and administrative 
interpretation. 33 
It is implicit in the Foley decision that, if extraterritorial 
application of a statute would not infringe on the sovereignty of a 
foreign state, the Court would ,not require the same "clearly ex-
pressed purpose" to extend the act's scope. This implication is con-
sistent with the fact that, in such a situation, the second consideration 
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality is no longer a 
relevant indication of congressional intent. Where this second consid-
eration_ is not applicable, the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
supported only by the first consideration-that Congress is primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions and therefore probably intends 
its enactments to apply only within the United States. It is submitted 
that this consideration is not sufficient to override a determination 
that, whether or not there is a clear expression, Congress actually 
intended a particular statute to have extraterritorial scope. Thus, 
this first consideration alone would merely require the party advocat-
ing extraterritoriality to sustain the burden of proof that Congress 
did in fact intend the law to have extraterritorial application. 
This conclusion finds support in the line of cases that have 
inferred congressional intent to legislate extraterritorially where such 
a construction did not transgress principles of international law. In 
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.34 and United States v. Bowman,36 no 
question of interference with either foreign sovereignty or foreign 
nationals was involved. In both cases, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the policy implications of extraterritorial application of the stat-
utes in issue and concluded, on that basis, that Congress intended 
30. 40 U.S.C. § 324 (1948), repealed, Act of Aug. 13, 1962, Pub. L No. 87-581, 
§ 203, 76 Stat. 360. 
31. 336 U.S. at 285. 
32. 336 U.S. at 286. 
33. See 336 U.S. at 285-90. 
34. 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
35. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
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the laws to have extraterritorial scope. In neither case did the Court 
require a clear statement of congressional intent. In Leasco Data 
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,36 the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit applied section 1 O(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act37 to foreign securities transactions consummated outside the 
United States. The court determined that the presumption "that, 
absent the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have 
meant to go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law"38 
was inapplicable because the fraudulent acts alleged to have been 
performed in the United States were sufficient to confer regulatory 
authority on Congress. On the basis of this determination, the court 
examined the legislative history and policies of the Exchange Act 
and concluded: "[W]e must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had 
thought about the point, it would not have wished to protect an 
American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and 
fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad-a 
purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace."39 Finally, 
in People of Saipan v. Department of Interior,40 the district court 
considered the application of NEPA to the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands.41 Since this territory, though outside the territorial 
United States, is subject to the authority of the United States, no 
issues of international law were involved. 42 Nevertheless, the 
defendants argued "that because there is no specific language in 
NEPA extending the statute's coverage to the Trust Territory, th[e] 
court must restrict its application to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States."43 The court rejected the application of such a 
"mechanical rule" and concluded that a consideration of "all avail-
able evidence of legislative intent" was sufficient to support the con-
clusion that Congress intended to extend NEPA's scope to the terri-
tory in issue. 44 
As previously indicated, the extraterritorial application of NEPA 
would not transgress accepted principles of international law since 
the imposition of its procedures on federal agencies abroad would 
36. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). 
38. 468 F.2d at 1334. 
39. 468 F.2d at 1337. 
40. 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii 1973 ), modified on other grounds sub nom. 
People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. United States, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). 
41. The application of NEPA to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands bad 
previously been considered in People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. 
Hawaii 1973), although the court did not explicitly consider the presumption against 
extraterritorial application. 
42. See People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
43. 356 F. Supp. at 649. 
44. 356 F. Supp. at 650. 
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not infringe on either foreign sovereignty or the rights of foreign 
nationals. Thus, a court should not require a "clear indication" of 
legislative intent in order to apply the Act to the extraterritorial 
activities of federal agencies. Rather, as in Leasco, a court should 
consider all the relevant manifestations of congressional intent to 
determine "whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it 
would have wished to" extend the scope of NEPA's procedural 
mandate. 
ill. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. Section 102(2)-The Inclusiveness 
of "All Agencies" 
An initial issue in determining the territorial scope of NEP A's 
section 102(2) requirements is whether Congress intended "all 
agencies of the Federal Government" to mean all agencies anywhere 
in the world. The phrase is unqualified and its clear and natural 
meaning is that every federal agency, regardless of the locus of its 
activities, was intended to be included. The issue of particular 
agency exemptions was specifically considered by the conference 
committee45 when it added the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" 
to section 102: "The purpose of the new language is to make it clear 
that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the 
directives set out in such subparagraphs [ (A) through (H)] unless 
the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly pro-
hibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible. 
. . . [N]o agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of 
existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance."46 
The courts have followed this interpretation and have strictly 
construed the "all agencies" provision of section 102.47 Several tem-
porary agencies have been exempted from NEPA procedures in 
specific situations on the ground that, since compliance would have 
been impossible, Congress must have intended their exemption. 48 
45. NEPA is derived from a combination of bills passed concurrently in the 
House and Senate. When the Senate submitted its bill to the House for ratification, 
the House struck out the entire content and substituted its own bill. Following 
congressional procedure, both bills went to a joint House-Senate conference commit-
tee, from which NEPA in its final form emerged. See note 81 infra. 
46. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969) [hereinafter 
Conference Report]. 
41. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 49-55. 
Section 104 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970), which may exempt agencies 
from some NEPA requirements in order to avoid conflict with more specific environ-
mental protection statutes, see F. ANDERSON, supra, at 108-22, will rarely, if ever, be 
relevant to extraterritorial actions. 
48. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974); Cohen v. 
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These exemptions, however, have all been consistent with the con-
ference committee's expressed intention to exempt agencies in situa-
tions where NEPA's requirements would conflict with their other 
statutory duties. 
The cases dealing with the application of NEPA procedures to 
domestic military activities further buttress this interpretation. Al-
though at times the judiciary has displayed a reluctance to apply 
NEPA fully to the military,49 it is clear that no over-all military ex-
emption exists.00 In Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Sea-
borg, 51 a NEPA case involving the controversial nuclear test on 
Amchitka Island in Alaska, the court of appeals clearly believed that 
the NEPA procedures were applicable to the test, 52 although it re-
frained from issuing an injunction due to national security considera-
tions. 53 Similarly, in People of Enewetak v. Laird,54 the district 
court, without even considering a blanket exemption on national 
security grounds, applied the impact statement requirement to 
simulated nuclear explosions by the military. Thus, even the mili-
tary must comply with section 102(2) "to the fullest extent possible"; 
exemptions would only be appropriate in specific situations where 
compliance with the impact statement requirement is impossible. 
Price Commn., 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). These cases rest more on the 
necessity for expeditious action inherent in the agency's mandate than on the 
"temporary" quality of the agency itself. See text at notes 133-41 infra. 
49. For example, in McQuery v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971), the court 
dismissed a challenge to the storage of chemical and biological warfare agents at the 
Rocky Mountain arsenal for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that "[p]ublic 
disclosure relating to military-defense facilities creates serious problems involving 
national security," and held that NEPA did not create any substantive rights to 
challenge the arsenal: "In its proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government 
has traditionally exercised unfettered control with respect to internal management and 
operation of federal military establishments." 449 F.2d at 612. The complaint, 
however, apparently did not allege any violations of section 102 or request an impact 
statement, see 449 F.2d at 609, and the court disclaimed any "inten[t] to imply that 
the federal officers and agencies charged with the administration and operation of 
arsenals are exempt from [NEPA]," 449 F.2d at 612. See also Nielson v. Seaborg, 
348 F. Supp. 1369, 1373-74 (D. Utah 1972) (NEPA violations not squarely raised by 
the complaint; dictum that AEC's discretionary weighing of environmental against 
national security considerations not reviewable); Citizens for Reid State Park v. 
Laird, 356 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972) (no impact statement required since mock 
amphibious invasion of state park would not "significantly" affect "the quality of the 
human environment" within the meaning of section 102). 
50. The Defense Department has apparently acquiesced in this conclusion. See 
32 C.F.R. § 214.6 (1975). 
51. 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.) (reversing summary judgment for AEC), 463 F.2d 
789 (D.C. Cir.) (affirming discovery order), 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to 
reverse denial of preliminary injunction and to order withholding of certain docu-
ments from discovery), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction denied sub 
nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). 
52. See 463 F.2d at 785. 
53. 463 F.2d at 798. 
54. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
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Furthermore, there are some specific indications that Congress 
intended to extend NEPA's procedures to federal agencies abroad. 
Section 102(2)(E)55 requires "all agencies" to "recognize the 
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, 
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend 
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed 
to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing 
a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment . . . ." The 
Senate report specifically states that "all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment which have international responsibilities" shall carry out this 
directive. r; 6 Because the "all agencies" term applies to section 
102(2) as a whole, and not merely to section 102(2)(E), agencies 
with "international responsibilities" should have to comply with all 
section 102(2) procedures, including the impact statement require-
ment. 
B. Section 102(2J(C)-The Scope of "Human Environment" 
Once it is determined that "all agencies" includes federal 
agencies abroad and that, as a result, these agencies must comply 
with the section 102(2)(C) impact statement requirement, consid-
eration must be given to what section 102(2)(C) requires. Specifi-
cally, it must be determined whether it requires federal agencies to 
prepare impact statements for actions that have significant environ-
mental consequences solely outside the United States. 
Section 102(2)(C) requires "all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment" to prepare environmental impact statements for "major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment."57 The fundamental issue in construing this provision 
is whether Congress intended the phrase "human environment" to 
mean the environment of the world or only the environment of the 
United States. 
1. Statutory Language 
The phrase "human environment" is not self-defining; it cannot 
be inferred that simply because Congress used "human environ-
ment," rather than "national environment," it intended section 
102(2)(C) to apply to the worldwide environment. It seems clear 
that Congress utilized the former phrase to ensure that environ-
mental consequences would be viewed from the human perspective 
rather than solely from an objective physical perspective.r.8 In intro-
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1970). 
56. S. REP. No. 91-296, supra note 4, at 21. 
57. (Emphasis added.) Section 102(2) (C) is set out at note 6 supra and 
accompanying text. 
58. Thus an eyesore, perhaps unobjectionable when viewed from a purely physical 
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ducing the conference committee report on NEPA to the Senate, 
Senator Jackson stated: 
An environmental policy is a policy for people. Its primary con-
cern is with man and his future. The basic principle of the policy 
is that we must strive in all that we do to achieve a standard of 
excellence in man's relationships to his physical surroundings. If 
there are to be departures from this standard of excellence they 
should be exceptions to the rule and the policy. And as exceptions, 
they will have to be justified in the light of public scrutiny as required 
by section 102.59 
Similarly, Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell, the originator of the concept of 
an impact statement requirement, 60 noted in the Senate hearings: 
"[W]hen we speak of the environment, basically, we are talking 
about the relationship between man and these physical and biologi-
cal and social forces that impact upon him. A public policy for the 
environment basically is not a public policy for those things out there. 
It is a policy for people."01 Thus, the phrase "human environment" 
only indicates the type of effects intended to be included; no conclu-
sion can be drawn from this language about the section's intended 
territorial scope. 
Although section 102(2) (C)'s language is unilluminating, 
support for the inference that "human environment" was intended 
to encompass the worldwide environment can be gleaned from the 
rest of NEPA. Since section 102(2)(E) is the one section where 
Congress specifically expressed its concern for the worldwide en-
vironment, it is the most appropriate starting-point for such an 
analysis. The first clause of this section directs federal agencies to 
"recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental 
problems." Although clearly indicating that Congress recognized 
the international dimensions of environmental protection, section 
102(2)(E) is ambiguous with regard to whether the "recognition" 
directive was intended to apply to the implementation of all the sec-
tion 102(2) procedures or only to the second mandate of section 
102(E)-that agencies "lend appropriate support to initiatives, 
resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international coop-
eration" in environmental protection. Acceptance of the latter inter-
pretation would make section 102(2)(E) the sole NEPA safeguard 
against degradation of the international environment. This interpre-
tation, however, is inconsistent with the fact that most of the section 
perspective, can be seen to have recognizable adverse environmental consequences 
when viewed from the human perspective adopted by the Act. 
59. 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969). 
60. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 6. 
61. Hearings 011 S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1969) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearings]. 
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102(2) subsections supplement each other and do not stand as inde-
pendent provisions. For example, the section 102(2)(D) directive 
to develop appropriate alternatives for unresolved conflicts in re-
source use would clearly not free the acting agency from the section 
102(2)(C) requirement that alternatives be analyzed in the impact 
statement. Similarly, the section 102(2)(A) mandate to "utilize a 
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure an integrated 
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design 
arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an impact 
on man's environment" would not relieve an agency from its respon-
sibility to utilize this same approach in the preparation of the 
section 102(2)(C) impact statement. Thus, the fact that section 
102(2)(E) specifically focuses on the worldwide environmental 
problem does not indicate that Congress intended international 
cooperation to be the sole device for safeguarding the worldwide en-
vironment. 
In fact, further analysis of section 102(2)(E) supports the 
conclusion that Congress intended federal agencies to recognize the 
"worldwide character" of environmental problems in the implemen-
tation of all section 102(2) procedures. Section 102(2)(E) directs 
federal agencies to recognize both "the worldwide and long-range 
character of environmental problems," and this phrase must be con-
sidered as a whole. The question is therefore whether Congress 
intended section 102(2)(E) to be the exclusive procedure for the 
consideration of both long-range and worldwide aspects of environ-
mental protection or whether it intended both aspects to be consid-
ered in all NEPA procedures. Although Congress did not specifi-
cally articulate its concern elsewhere in section 102(2), 02 there can 
be no doubt that it intended long-range environmental impacts to be 
considered in all the section 102(2) procedures. 63 Therefore, in 
order to interpret consistently the "worldwide and long-range" 
phrase, it should be concluded that the section 102(2)(E) mandate 
to recognize the worldwide character of environmental problems was 
also intended to apply to all the NEPA procedures;0·1 the inter-
62. Section 102(2) (C) (iv) refers only to the "enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity" and does not specifically refer to the more general problem of Jong-range 
environmental degradation. 
63. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-296, supra note 4, at 8 (''S. 1075 is also designed to 
deal with the long-range implications of many of the critical environmental problems 
which have caused great public concern in recent years"). 
64. It has also been argued: "It would be manifestly illogical to conclude that 
Congress on the one hand intended the impact statement requirement of § 102(2) (C) 
to apply where the environmental effects occurred abroad and, on the other hand, 
made no provision for circulation to, and comment by, foreign governments, the very 
authorities which would be most knowledgeable about their respective environments 
and most concerned about potential impacts." Intervenors-Defendants Memorandum 
of Points of Law and Authorities in Opposition to Paragraph (e) of Plaintiffs Cross-
Motion For Summary Judgment at 7, Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENV. L. REP. 20,685 
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national cooperation provision should thus be viewed as merely an 
additional procedure for ensuring worldwide environmental protec-
tion. 
From the above, it seems likely that Congress intended the 
"human environment" phrase of section 102(2)(C) to extend 
beyond the territorial limits of the United States. The fact that Con-
gress used the more explicit phrase "mankind's world environment" 
in section 102(2)(E) should not preclude this construction. 65 First, 
section 102(2)(E) expressly deals with environmental degradation 
on a worldwide scale, so it is not unusual that this is reemphasized 
by speaking in terms of the world environment. Second, the mean-
ing of section 102(2)(C) would clearly be different if it required a 
significant effect upon "the quality of the world environment" as a 
precondition to the impact statement requirement since this would 
arguably exempt any actions having only local effects. 
The other section 102(2) subsections also support this construc-
tion of "human environment" in section 102(2)(C). These sub-
sections in part require all agencies to develop methods and proce-
dures to ensure that environmental factors are considered in their 
decision-making, 66 to study and develop alternatives to unresolved 
conflicts of resource use in their activities, 67 and to utilize environ-
mental information in the development of •:resource-oriented" proj-
ects. 68 Since it has already been concluded that all federal agen-
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974). The fact that Congress did not specifically provide in 
section 102(2) (C) for such circulation to, and comment by, foreign governments is 
immaterial for two reasons: First, to the extent that the comment provision requires 
"any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to 
any environmental impact involved" to comment, it is clear that Congress could not 
have similarly required input from foreign governments. Second, since the Council 
on Environmental Quality's guidelines for compliance with NEPA require "a copy of 
the draft statement ... in all cases [to] be sent to any applicant whose project is the 
subject of the statement," 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1974), foreign governments would 
have the same opportunity for comment that other applicants have. 
65. An analogous argument is that, since the section 102(2) (E) provision for 
international cooperation is qualified with "where consistent with the foreign policy 
of the United States," Congress would have similarly qualified section 102(2) (C) if it 
had intended that section to apply to federal environmental impacts abroad. How-
ever, this argument is not persuasive. The qualification was included only in the 
clause of section 102(2) (E) that directs federal agencies to lend appropriate support 
to international environmental cooperation. Because that provision is an actual 
foreign-policy directive, Congress obviously wanted the agencies to retain some 
discretion over the matter. In contrast, since section 102(2) (C) is merely proced-
ural, and at most would influence an agency in a foreign-policy decision, see text at 
notes 146-47 infra, there was no need for a foreign-policy qualification in section 
102(2)(C). 
66. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2) (B) (1970). 
67. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(0) (1970). 
68. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(0) (1970). 
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cies must comply with these procedures, 00 and because none of these 
procedures contain qualifiers (such as "human environment") that 
could be interpreted as territorial limitations, 70 these procedures in-
dicate that environmental considerations were intended to be impor-
tant aspects in the planning of federal activities abroad as well as 
within the United States. In light of this conclusion, it is reasonable 
to infer that Congress intended "human environment" in section 
102(2)(C) ~o mean the environment of all man. This interpreta-
tion would merely make the scope of section 102(2)(C) co-exten-
sive with that of the rest of section 102(2). 
The statement of general purpose in section 2 also supports a 
broad interpretation of the territorial scope of the impact statement 
requirement. It expresses Congress' intent "to promote efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and bio-
sphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man" and to encour-
age "harmony between man and his environment." This statement 
aids an extraterritorial construction in two respects. First, "bio-
sphere" refers to the relatively thin layer surrounding the earth in 
which life exists. 71 A stated congressional purpose is thus to prevent 
or eliminate damage to the earth's environment and it would there-
fore be unreasonable, in the absence of serious countervailing poli-
cies, to assume that Congress intended to limit its extraterritorial ef-
forts to the mere support of international cooperation. Since it had 
the opportunity to make a significant environmental contribution by 
requiring federal agencies abroad to assess the environmental 
impacts of their activities, it is likely that Congress intended to do 
so. Second, the word "man" is generally used to refer to the whole 
human race; unlike the use of "human" to give subjective content 
to "environment" in section 102(2)(C), 72 the phrase "man and his 
environment" implies that Congress was concerned with the environ-
ment of all man. 73 This literal interpretation of "man" thus supports 
an extraterritorial construction of "human environment" in section 
102(2)(C). 
Finally, the numerous specific references to Americans and the 
nation throughout NEPA, 74 which make the Act appear domestically 
oriented, are not necessarily inconsistent with an expansive interpre-
69. See text at notes 45-56 supra. 
70. Section 102(2)(A) uses "man's environment" in much the same way section 
102(2)(C) uses "human environment" and thus is subject to similar territorial 
ambiguity. 
71. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 219 ( 1971). 
72. See text at notes 58-64 supra. 
73. See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 
433l(a) (1970). 
74. See, e.g., §§ l0l(a), 102(b)(2), 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(a), 4332(b)(2), 
4342 (1970). 
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tation of "human environment." Wherever such statements appear 
they are accompanied by broadly worded statements that speak gen-
erally of man and the environment. For example, although section 
101 (a) 75 speaks of "fulfill[ing] the social, economic, and other 
requirements of the present and future generations of Americans," 
it also states that it is the federal policy "to create and maintain con-
ditions under which man and nature can exist in productive har-
mony." Similarly, while section 101 (b )(2) specifically speaks of 
"assur[ing] for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and esthet-
ically and culturally pleasing surroundings," section 101 (b )( 1) 
declares that the United States should "fulfill the responsibilities of 
each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding genera-
tions," and section 101(b)(3) directs the nation to "attain the widest 
range of the beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, 
risk ,to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences." Furthermore, despite the domestically oriented appear-
ance of the requirements of the. mandated section 201 annual 
Environmental Quality Report, section 201 ( 4) 76 requires a general 
review of federal programs and activities "with particular reference 
to their effect on the environment and on the conservation, develop-
ment and utilization of natural resources." This review is not ex-
pressly limited to effects within the United States, and, in light of the 
dependence of this nation on natural resources from other countries, 
it would be reasonable to interpret this section as applying to effects 
on resources worldwide. 
Although Congress' foremost concern was certainly with the do-
mestic environment, a reasonable construction of NEPA as a whole, 
especially in view of the express concern for the worldwide environ-
ment in section 102(2)(E), is that Congress sought not only to 
attain acceptable environmental quality in the United States, but 
also to minimize the degradation of the worldwide environment re-
sulting from federal activities abroad. Thus, specific references to 
Americans and "the nation" do not vitiate the conclusion that 
"human environment" was intended to encompass the worldwide 
environment and that section 102(2) (C) should, therefore, be ap-
plied to the activities of federal agencies abroad. 
2. Legislative History 
The legislative history of NEPA, despite its dearth of commen-
tary on the issue of extraterritoriality, also supports this construction 
of the section 102(2)(C) impact statement requirement. Although 
the need for a comprehensive national environmental policy had long 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970). 
76. 42 u.s.c. § 4341(4) (1970). 
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been recognized by Congress, 77 it was not until 1968 that Congress 
seriously attempted to formulate such a policy. In that year, a joint 
House-Senate colloquium was convened to articulate the elements 
of a national policy; the results of the colloquium were analyzed in 
the Congressional White Paper on a National Policy for the Environ-
ment. 78 The White Paper begins with a summary of the colloquium, 
a significant portion of which focused on the "[i]nternational aspects 
of environmental alteration," and notes that testimony was given 
underscoring the "urgent necessity of taking in account major envi-
ronmental influences of foreign economic assistance and other inter-
national developments."70 Significantly, the statement of national 
environmental policy proposed by the White Paper declares: 
Environmental quality and productivity shall be considered in a 
worldwide context, extending in time from the present to the long-
term future. 
The requirement to maintain and enhance long-term productivity 
and quality of the environment takes precedence over local, short-
term usage. This policy recognizes the responsibility to future gener-
ations of those presently controlling the development of natural re-
sources and the modification of the living landscape. Although the 
influence of the U.S. policy will be limited outside of its own borders, 
the global character of ecological relationships must be the guide for 
domestic activities. Ecological considerations should be infused into 
all international relations. 80 
The legislative history of the bills that directly contributed to the 
final form of NEPA 81 is not, however, comparably clear on this issue. 
Since most of title I of NEPA, including section 102, came directly 
from the Senate bill (S. 107 5), the Senate hearings and report are 
likely to be accorded the greatest weight in interpreting section 
102(2)(C). However, because S. 107 5 was extensively redrafted 
after the hearings to include the present declaration of national 
environmental policy and the section 102(2) procedures, the hear-
ings are not entirely apposite. In its original form, S. 1075, "A BILL 
to authorize . . . investigations . . . and research relating to the 
Nation's ecological systems, natural resources, and environmental 
71. See 115 CoNG. REc. 29,067 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
78. The White Paper was introduced into the records of the debates on NEPA by 
Senator Jackson on Oct. 8, 1969. 115 CONG. REC. 29,078 (1969). 
19. Id. at 29,079. 
80. Id. at 29,081-82. 
81. The final wording of NEPA was drawn up in a joint Senate-House confer-
ence, which combined independent Senate and House bills. See Conference Report, 
supra note 46. Most of NEPA came directly from the Senate bill, S. 1075, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The conference committee inserted as NEPA section 
l0l(a) the declaration of environmental policy in the House bill, H.R. 12549, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and left the Senate statement of policy in as section 101 (b ). 
All other title I sections are from S. 1075; most of title II is from H.R. 12549. 
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quality . . .,"82 was largely directed toward the environmental prob-
lems of the United States. It has been suggested that the scope of 
the original bill may have been intentionally limited by Senator Jack-
son in order to ensure that his own Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee would have jurisdiction. 83 
In light of the White Paper's express concern for the worldwide 
environment, it is surprising that little attention was accorded to the 
limited territorial scope of S. 1075 during the Senate hearings. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell stated: 
The term "environment" includes the life-support system of our 
nation and all the earth-the system of interactions of people with 
the air, water, land, and living organisms that comprise the bio-
sphere-the interactions of those elements in our world capable of 
sustaining life. And although our immediate concern is with environ-
mental policy in America, that policy must permit our nation to play 
a constructive role in international efforts to safeguard a biosphere 
of the whole earth. For this sphere of life . . . is an ecological unity. 
All men, together with all other living things, depend on its self-
renewing capabilities for their continuing existence. 84 
Similarly, the Department of State, in its statement, recommended 
that the bill should recognize that 
1. The deterioration of the national environment is part of a 
global process and thus requires remedial action on an inter-
national as well as a national scale. 
2. Study, review and research must, therefore, be extended to 
take into account problems . . . beyond national borders. 
3. The solution of the environmental problem being a matter of 
national interest as well as of international concern, U.S. par-
ticipation in bilateral and multilateral programs dealing with 
the international aspects of the problem must be recognized 
as a vital part of U.S. policy to cope with environmental 
problems. 85 
Section 102 (including section 102(2)(E) ) was added to the 
bill following these hearings. Unfortunately, the legislative history 
does not indicate precisely what was intended by the addition. The 
statement accompanying the amended bill86 did not state whether 
the international cooperation provision of section 102(2)(E) was 
intended to be the sole protection for the international environment, 
thus specifically following the State Department's third recommenda-
tion, or whether in response to the general policies articulated in the 
82. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 1. See also id. at 21. 
83. F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 5. 
84. Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 128. 
85. Id. at 10 (statement of W. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations). 
86. Id, at 205-06. 
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hearings, all of section 102(2) was intended to minimize degrada-
tion of the international environment. It is significant, however, that 
the amendments removed the prior emphasis on the national envi-
ronment. For example, the original title of S. 1075 authorized 
studies, surveys, and research "relating to the Nation's ecological sys-
tems, natural resources, and environmental quality."87 In contrast, 
the amended title of S. 1075 authorized such studies "relating to 
ecological systems, natural resources, and the quality of the human 
environment."88 Although the conference committee abbreviated 
this clause of the amended title to "other purposes," it is significant 
that the de-emphasis on the domestic orientation of the bill was 
accompanied by the inclusion of the term "human environment" in 
the title, as well as in section 102(2)(C). Thus, a reasonable infer-
ence is that "human environment" was intended to connote the 
worldwide environment. 
Although the Senate report was prepared after the extensive 
amendments to S. 1075, it too fails to address the issue of the terri-
torial scope of section 102(2)(C). For the most part, the section 
102(2) provisions are merely restated; little amplification on their 
meaning is provided. 80 Nevertheless, the report does provide some 
additional insight relevant to the issue. There are a number of 
specific references in the Senate report to the environment of the 
nation. However, as with the statutory language itself, there are also 
numerous statements in the Senate report that support the interpre-
tation that Congress intended both to attain acceptable environ-
mental quality in the United States and to help protect the world 
environment, not only through bilateral cooperation, but also by 
minimizing the deleterious effects of federal activities abroad. For 
example, it states: 
Important decisions concerning the use and shape of man's future 
environment continue to be made in small but steady increments 
which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of 
previous decades. . . . The ultimate issue posed by short-sighted, 
conflicting, and often selfish demands and pressures upon the finite 
resources of the earth are clear. As a nation and as a world, we 
face these conditions: ... a growing technological power which is far 
outstripping man's capacity to understand and ability to control its 
impact on the environment. 
The committee believes that America's capacity as a nation to 
confront these conditions . . . can be improved and broadened if 
Congress clarifies the goals, concepts, and procedures which deter-
mine and guide the programs and activities of Federal agencies. 00 
81. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
88. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
89. See S. REP. No. 91-296, supra note 4, at 19-21. 
90. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
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The conditions described in the first paragraph of this statement 
are expressly not confined to the United States, and a reasonable 
interpretation is that "America's capacity as a nation to confront these 
conditions" was intended to extend to all federal activities, including 
those not within the territorial United States. Significantly, this 
statement specifically suggests that "procedures ... [to] guide the 
programs and activities of Federal agencies" be utilized as a means 
of confronting worldwide environmental problems. The report also 
states that "[i]n seeking intensified beneficial utilization of the 
earth's resources, the Federal Government must take care to avoid 
degradation and misuse of resources, risk to man's continued health 
and safety, and other undesirable and unintended consequences"91 
and that "the survival of man, in a world in which decency and dig-
nity are possible, is the basic reason for bringing man's impact on 
his environment under informed and responsible control."92 Such 
statements directly support the interpretation that Congress intended 
section 102(2) (C) to be applied to federal activities worldwide. 
The legislative history in the House is also relevant to the issue 
of the territorial scope of section 102(2)(C). Although the House 
bill (H.R. 12549) did not include "action forcing" procedures such 
as section 102(2), it did contribute to NEPA the section 10~ 
statement of national environmental policy and most of title II, and, 
as suggested earlier, a broad interpretation of these sections supports 
the worldwide scope of section 102(2)(C).03 
Several statements in the House hearings indicate that such an 
interpretation of these sections is warranted. For exampJe, Margaret 
Mead emphasized that environmental problems "are planetary and 
the larger the framework with which we can deal with the better. 
Any discussion has to include the fact that these problems are inter-
national. . . . We are exporting insecticides and fertilizers to other 
countries and setting up in other countries technological problems 
that are giving them a great deal of trouble."94 Moreover, later testi-
mony concerning problems that the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) should confront focused on a number of worldwide 
problems, including the long-term effects of pesticides, the effects 
of an increasing accumulation of radioactive wastes, and the increase 
in the worldwide percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.95 
91. Id. at 18. 
92. Id. at 19. 
93. See text at notes 74-76 supra. 
94. Hearings on H.R. 6750, H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R. 12180, 
H.R. 12207, H.R. 12209, H.R. 12228, H.R. 12264, and H.R. 12409 Before the 
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1969). 
95. See, e.g., id. at 152 (statement of R. Macmullan, Director, Michigan Depart-
ment of Natural Resources); id. at 116-21 (statement of Sierra Club). 
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The House report on H.R. 12549 reemphasized these points: 
"The testimony at the hearing also stressed the importance of the 
international aspects of the environmental problem. It is an unfor-
tunate fact that many and perhaps most forms of environmental 
pollution cross international boundaries as easily as they cross State 
lines. . . . The international aspects are clearly a major part of the 
questions which the Council would have to confront . . . ."00 In 
addition, its discussion of the requirement of an annual environmen-
tal Quality Report,07 the House report states: "Implicit in this section 
is the understanding that the international implications of our current 
activities will also be considered, inseparable as they are from the 
purely national consequences of our actions."08 Significantly, this 
statement does not restrict the territorial scope of "current activities." 
Thus, in order to consider fully these "international implications," 
"current activities" should be interpreted to include federal programs 
and activities abroad. Although the House bill did not contain a pro-
vision comparable to the impact statement requirement of section 
102(2) (C), the intention that NEPA's section 102(2) (C) be viewed 
as an additional means to evaluate federal activities abroad can be 
inferred from the fact that the House intended the CEQ to review 
and appraise federal actions abroad. 
The report00 of the conference committee from which NEPA 
finally emerged also failed to address the issue of section 102(2) (C)'s 
territorial scope. The remarks of Senator Jackson in submitting 
the conference committee report to the Senate do, however, pro-
vide strong evidence of an intention to apply the NEPA procedures 
to the activities of federal agencies abroad: "What is involved 
is a congressional declaration that we do not intend, as a govern-
ment or as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the con• 
tinued existence or the health of mankind: That we will not 
intentionally initiate actions which will do irreparable damage to the 
air, land, and water which support life on earth."100 It is evident 
that compliance with the procedures of section 102(2), particularly 
section 102(2)(C) can be inferred from Senator Jackson's later 
statement identifying "human environment" with "man's life support 
system."101 
In conclusion, although the legislative history is not conclusive 
evidence of a congressional intention to apply section 102(2)(C) 
extraterritorially, it does demonstrate clearly that Congress was con-
96. H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969). 
97. This requirement appears in NEPA as section 201, 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1970). 
98. H.R. REP. No. 91-378, supra note 96, at 9. 
99. Conference Report, supra note 46. 
100. 115 CoNG. REC. 40,416 (1969), 
101. 115 CONG. R.Ec. 40,417 (1969). 
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cerned with the environmental problem on a worldwide as well as 
on a national scale. The dearth of legislative history specifically con-
cerning the territorial scope of section I 02(2)(C) probably results 
from the fact that Congress failed to consider this precise question 
at all. Nevertheless, there are specific indications in each stage of 
the legislative history that support the interpretation of "human 
environment" in section 102(2)(C) as the environment of all man. 
Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that Congress would have intended 
section I 02(2)(C) to apply to federal activities worldwide if it had 
actually considered the issue. 
This conclusion is supported by the results of the subsequent 
oversight hearings on NEPA, held in December 1970, by the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. During those hear-
ings, a representative of the Department of State directly confronted 
the committee with the issue of section 102(2) (C)'s territorial scope 
by arguing that the impact statement requirement should not apply to 
federal actions within the jurisdiction of another country.102 The com-
mittee, however, flatly rejected this argument: "The Department of 
State, in consultation with CEQ, should reconsider its position that 
AID supported projects need not be accompanied by '102' statements. 
Such a position is contrary to both the language and to the intent of 
NEPA."103 The committee report concluded: "Stated most charit-
ably, the committee disagrees with this interpretation of NEPA. 
The history of the Act makes it quite clear that the global effects 
of environmental decisions are inevitably a part of the decision-mak-
ing process and must be considered in that context."104 Although 
these subsequent oversight hearings are not part of NEPA's legisla-
tive history, they are nevertheless relevant to the interpretation of 
its territorial scope, particularly since this is probably the first time 
that Congress actually confronted the issue. 
C. Administrative and Judicial Interpretation 
Further support for this interpretation of extraterritorial scope of 
section 102(2) (C) is provided by the CEQ's position on the issue. 
In its August 1973 revised guidelines, issued to assist federal agen-
cies in complying with NEPA procedures, the CEQ directed that 
agencies should "assess the positive and negative effects of the 
proposed action as it affects both the national and international 
environment."105 Although this statement could be interpreted as 
referring only to the international impacts of federal actions within 
102. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 546-57 (memorandum of C. 
Herter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, State Department). 
103. H.R. REP. No. 92-316, supra note 13, at 6. 
104. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted). 
105. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(3)(i) (1974). 
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the United States, the CEQ has requested impact statements on fed-
eral activities abroad.106 Moreover, a resolution by the CEQ's 
Legal Advisory Committee states: "[11he language and legislative 
history of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the law 
of the United States, and the administrative procedures of the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality support the conclusion that § 102(2) 
(C) does apply to State and AID actions carried out within the 
territorial jurisdiction of another nation . . . ."107 Although CEQ's 
position on such matters is not conclusive, it has been accorded great 
weight by the courts. One court has stated that "[s]uch adminis-
strative interpretation cannot be ignored except for the strongest 
reasons, particularly where the interpretation is a construction of a 
statute by the men designated by the statute to put it into effect."108 
Although no court has yet ruled directly on the applicability of 
section 102(2)(C) to the international activities of federal agen-
cies, 109 several cases have addressed aspects of this territorial issue. 
People of Enewetak v. Laird110 involved NEPA's application to the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which, although not part of the 
territorial United States, is exclusively governed by the United 
States.111 The court held that NEPA, including the section 102(2) 
procedures, did extend to these islands.112 It based its conclusion, 
however, largely on the fact that "Nation" rather than "United 
States" was used throughout the Act: It interpreted this usage as 
evidence of a congressional intent that the Act apply to all United 
States possessions as well as to the territorial United States. Al-
though the court expressly avoided considering whether section 
102(2) (C) applies to federal activities worldwide,113 it did recog-
nize that "NEPA is framed in expansive language that clearly evi-
dences a concern for all persons subject to federal action which has 
a major impact on their environment-not merely United States' 
106. See Speech by R. Train, Chairman, CEQ, 102 MONITOR, Feb. 1973, at 1, 8. 
107. Legal Advisory Comm., Report to the President's Council on Environmental 
Quality 14, Dec. 1971. 
108. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F. Supp. 
806, 811 (E.D. Tenn.), atfd., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972), stay denied, 414 U.S. 
1036 (1973). 
109. In Sierra Club v. Coleman, Civ. No. 75-1040 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1975), 
NEPA was invoked to halt federal agency activity in Panama. The opinion of the 
court, however, did not address the issue of extraterritorial applicability. See note 9 
supra. 
110. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
111. See 353 F. Supp. at 818-19. 
112. In People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii 
1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. 
Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 
(1975), the district court reaffirmed its position that NEPA applies to the Trust 
Territories. 
113. 353 F. Supp. at 817 n.10. 
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citizens located in the fifty states."114 The court further noted that 
NEPA's legislative history fully supports such a broad interpretation 
of the Act's scope and "demonstrates that Congress clearly recog-
nized that environmental problems are worldwide in scope [and] 
was therefore particularly concerned about the international implica-
tions of United States actions that affect the human environment."115 
A second case that supports an extraterritorial interpretation of 
section 102(2) (C) is Wilderness Society v. Morton,116 in which 
certain Canadians moved to intervene in NEPA litigation challenging 
the adequacy of the impact statement for the Alaskan pipeline on 
the ground that the people and the environment of Canada would 
not be satisfactorily represented by existing plaintiffs' counsel. Al-
though the opinion is brief and does not discuss the scope of section 
102(2)(C), a necessary implication of the court's granting of the 
motion is that the plaintiff-foreigners had been conferred some rights 
by NEP A.117 The case thus directly supports the interpretation of 
"human environment" in section 102(2)(C) as the environment of 
all man.118 
D. Policy Considerations 
Although the statutory language, legislative history, and extant 
administrative and judicial interpretations of NEPA all support an 
extraterritorial interpretation of section 102(2)(C)'s scope, ultimate 
resolution of this issue requires an analysis of the countervailing 
policy considerations. Opponents of an extraterritorial construction 
of section 102(2)(C) ,have contended that it will result in substantial 
practical difficulties for federal agencies functioning abroad and thus 
will interfere with the implementation of United States foreign 
policy. Eximbank has argued that section 102(2)(C)'s disclosure 
requirements would frustrate foreign government demands for confi-
dence of negotiations 110 and that the quick, decisive action often 
necessary for successful international negotiations would not be 
possible within the NEPA framework.120 It has emphasized that the 
114. 353 F. Supp. at 816. 
115. 353 F. Supp. at 817. 
116. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
111. See People of Eneweta-k v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 818 (D. Hawaii 1973) 
("Wilderness Society seems to hold that NEPA provides foreign nationals with 
certain rights when their environment is endangered by federal actions"). 
118. However, because the proposed federal action was to take place within the 
United States, Wilderness Society does not necessarily support the interpretation that 
agencies acting within the jurisdiction of another country must comply with section 
102(2)(C). 
119. ~ee Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Defendant Export-Import 
Bank of the United States at 7; Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ENV. L. REP. 20,685 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 3, 1974). 
120. See id. 
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United States is in competition with other governments for foreign 
markets and has claimed that the delay inherent in NEPA proce-
dures and the uncertainty whether Eximbank commitments will with-
stand judicial scrutiny would put the agency at a great competitive 
disadvantage.121 
The need for confidentiality of military and diplomatic secrets 
should not present a significant problem. Such secrets need not be 
released to the public in an impact statement, even if they are 
directly relevant to environmental considerations. Section 102 
(2)(C) itself grants an exemption for these secrets by requiring the 
release of statements to the public pursuant to the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA), 122 which expressly exempts the release of infor-
mation that "(A) [isJ specifically authorized under criteria estab-
lished by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and (B) [is] in fact properly 
classified pursuant to such Executive order."123 As a practical 
matter, such confidential information is usually omitted from impact 
statements to enable its distribution to the public. For example, 
despite the fact that some military and diplomatic secrets were 
involved in the underground nuclear blast on Amchitka Island, the 
military simply omitted these from the impact statement and then 
released it for public inspection and comment.124 Where the FOIA 
does not exempt information from disclosure, but where it is never-
theless in the interest of the United States to maintain the confiden-
tiality of a negotiation position, the agency involved could still 
satisfy the objectives of section 102(2)(C) by merely stating the 
environmental impacts of all alternatives without revealing favored 
positions. This approach has been utilized by the Department of 
State in releasing impact statements on the negotiations of inter-
national agreements.125 
The practical difficulty of the delay inherent in the preparation 
of section 102(2)(C) impact statements, which could interfere with 
the functioning of federal agencies in the international sphere, 
presents a somewhat more difficult problem. The CEQ guidelines 
require that a minimum of ninety days must elapse between prepara-
121. See Eximbank's Opposition, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. Feb. 1975). 
123. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See generally Project, Govern-
ment Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1047-50 (1975). 
124. See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 791 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
125. The Department of State regulations for compliance with NEPA state that 
"[w]here appropriate, a draft statement may be prepared prior to the establishment of 
a U.S. position, indicating that two or more alternatives are under consideration 
without specifying the Department's preference." 37 Fed. Reg. 19,168 (1972). Cf. 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1975) (CEQ Guidelines). 
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tion of the draft impact statement126 and commencement of the 
action.127 However, they also provide: 
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action 
with significant environmental impact without observing the provi-
sions of ·these guidelines concerning minimum periods for agency re-
view and advance availability of environmental statements, the Feder-
al agency proposing to take the action should consult with the 
Council about alternative arrangements. Similarly where there are 
overriding considerations of expense to the Government or impaired 
program effectiveness, the responsible agency should consult with the 
Council concerning appropriate modifications of the minimum peri-
ods.12s 
This provision indicates that the CEQ can be responsive to the 
difficulties of NEPA compliance and will grant a reduction of the 
minimum period under appropriate circumstances. A comment by 
the three-judge district court in Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States,129 indicates that the 
courts too may be responsive to this problem: "We might look with 
sympathy, for example, on some modifications in the time require-
ments for draft impact statements and comments contained in the 
CEQ Guidelines so as to better accommodate them to the fast-moving 
suspension process."130 
In certain situations, however, even if the waiting period is 
shortened, the burden and delay of preparing an adequate impact 
statement may still interfere materially with the activities of a federal 
agency abroad.131 An example of such a situation would be an inter-
national negotiation with a significant environmental impact, where 
time restraints make preparation of an impact statement infeasible. 
In such a case, the policy argument against application of NEPA pro-
cedures would be very strong if no resolution of this conflict were 
possible. 
126. The CEQ has interpreted the circulation and comment provision of section 
102(2)(C) as requiring the preparation of a draft environmental statement to be 
made available for public comment as well as comment by other agencies. 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 1500.7, .11 (1975). 
127. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.ll(b) (1975). 
128. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.11 (e) (1975). 
129. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), revd. on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973 ). 
130. 346 F. Supp. at 199 n.12. 
131. One method by which this burden could be minimized would be the use of 
statements outlining a general program. In practice, many activities by federal 
agencies abroad are part of an ongoing program, such as providing pesticides and 
fertilizers to nations in need, or the exporting of nuclear power plants. Wherever 
such a program is involved, a programmatic impact statement could be prepared 
describing the generalities of the program. Much briefer and less complex impact 
statements, dealing only with matters particular to each action, could then be 
prepared for individual actions. 
376 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:349 
The courts have strictly construed the "to the fullest extent 
possible" qualification in the section 102(2) mandate and have held 
that mere "[c]onsiderations of administrative difficulty, delay or 
economic cost will not suffice to strip [section 102] of its fundamen-
tal importance."132 Nevertheless, the courts have exempted federal 
agencies from NEPA's procedural requirements where "the existing 
law applicable to such agen[cies'] operations ... makes full com-
pliance ... impossible."133 In Cohen v. Price Commission,134 the 
plaintiff sought to have a commission-approved price increase en-
joined because the agency had failed to comply with NEPA's pro-
cedures. In refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, the district 
court stated: 
[A] fair reading of the provisions of NEPA and the Economic 
Stabilization Act, and their respective basic purposes indicates a sub-
stantial question as to whether NEPA is applicable to the Price 
Commission-a temporary agency and one intended to act upon 
matters within its authority with dispatch-whose function would 
readily be defeated and frustrated by bureaucratic delays were it 
required to [comply with NEPA's procedures].135 
Similarly, in the more recent case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 136 the 
District Court for the District of Columbia applied the Cohen 
rationale to hold that the Federal Energy Office (FEO) was not 
required to prepare an environmental impact statement on regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation 
Act of 1973:137 "[It is] abundantly clear that Congress had intended 
the FEO administrator to proceed expeditiously. Compliance with 
NEPA, on the other hand, would disarm the FEO of its ability and 
authority to take necessary action with the required degree of 
speed."138 Finally, two cases involving challenges to the ICC's fail-
ure to prepare an impact statement for proposed rate increases sup-
port the proposition that impossibility of compliance can be grounds 
for exemption from NEPA's procedures. In Port of New York 
Authority v. United States, 130 the Second Circuit indicated that, 
because of the nature of the challenged proceedings, preparation of 
an impact statement should not be required: "The detailed evalua-
tion of benefits and costs required by NEPA is not possible at the 
132. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C, 
Cir. 1971). 
133. Conference Report, supra note 46, at 9. 
134. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
135. 337 F. Supp. at 1241. 
136. 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974). 
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 151-56 (Supp. III, 1973 ), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
753(g)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975), as amended, Emergency Petroleum Act of 1975, Pub. 
L. No. 94-99, 89 Stat. 481. 
138. 373 F. Supp. at 1105. 
139. 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971), 
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stage of the review of the lawfulness of proposed tariffs under focus 
here. . . . [Suspension proceedings] are simply not amenable to 
the careful balancing analysis required by NEPA."140 Although in 
SCRAP, a different conclusion was reached as to whether the nature 
of such proceedings precluded compliance with NEPA's mandate, 
the three-judge district court acknowledged that the appropriate 
approach to the issue of exemptions from NEPA's procedural 
requirements is to determine whether compliance is in fact impos-
sible.141 Thus, to the extent that the NEPA procedural duties 
irreconcilably conflict with the proper functioning of a federal agency 
in its international activities, the courts may be willing to exempt 
such activities from the impact statement requirement of section 
102(2)(C). 
Furthermore, the concern that NEPA might deprive federal agen-
cies acting abroad of the authority to make binding commitments 
( due to the possibility of subsequent injunction) does not appear 
warranted. As concluded earlier, 142 the substantive mandate of 
NEPA would not compel agencies to reach particular decisions 
concerning their activities abroad. Thus, such agency actions 
would, under NEPA, be subject to review or injunction by the 
courts only on the ground of noncompliance with the section 
102(2) procedures. Moreover, because of the general judicial re-
luctance to evaluate foreign policy objectives, a court might hesitate 
to enjoin agency actions abroad even in this situation. Such judicial 
hesistancy in the NEPA context is evidenced by Committee for 
Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg,143 in which the court, because of 
the significant weight it attributed to the government's "assertions of 
potential harm to national security and foreign policy,"144 refused to 
enjoin the impending nuclear test. Thus, even if a court determines 
that the impact statement for a foreign commitment is not entirely 
adequate, it might well refuse to enjoin the prospective action, at 
least if the agency had made a "good faith" effort to comply fully 
with NEPA.145 
140. 451 F.2d at 789-90. 
141. 346 F. Supp. 189, 199 (D.D.C. 1972). In reversing the district court 
decision, the Supreme Court expressly refrained from deciding this issue. United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 698 n.12 (1973). 
142. See text at and following notes 20-21 supra. 
143. 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction 
denied sub nom. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 
(1971). 
144. 463 F.2d at 798. 
145. However, as the Seaborg court emphasized, a court's refusal to enjoin an 
agency's actions does not release the agency from its obligation to prepare an 
environmental impact statement, even after the action has been completed: "Whatever 
the consequences of the [action], its mere occurrence will not moot the issue of the 
Government's compliance with laws designed to insure that environmental factors 
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In summary, NEPA can adequately accommodate the special 
· requirements of agencies acting abroad. The need for confiden-
tiality of certain matters and the necessity for expeditious action can 
be fully respected. Agencies acting abroad would only be subject 
to injunction for failure to comply with NEPA's procedures, and even 
this interference with their functioning would probably occur only 
when the agency had made less than a full disclosure of environmen-
tal considerations. 
A final policy argument against an expansive interpretation of 
the territorial scope of NEPA is that other nations might view it as 
an imposition of our environmental standards and thus resent it as 
"environmental imperialism." The extension of NEPA's procedures 
to federal agencies abroad, however, would in no way affect the ulti-
mate decision-making authority of the agency.140 Although United 
States assistance might be denied or conditioned upon grounds of 
environmental protection, this would only be the result of the 
inherent discretionary powers of the agency. The purpose of the 
NEPA procedures, and section 102(2)(C) in particular, is to ensure 
the recognition of environmental consequences during the federal 
decision-making process.147 This information would be as useful to 
the foreign country involved as to the participating federal agency 
in deciding whether a particular action should be undertaken. Con-
sidering the effort and expense involved in many of the federal 
activities abroad, it is only reasonable to provide both the federal 
agency and the foreign nation involved with the opportunity to maxi-
mize the over-all benefits of a proposed project by facilitating their 
consideration of environmental as well as economic and technical fac-
tors in the decision-making process. As illustrated by the problems 
resulting from the Aswan High Dam, 148 a sound understanding of 
possible environmental consequences is important even if the recipi-
ent country puts a much higher priority on economic development 
than environmental protection. Finally, even if an agency decision 
is adverse to the desires of the foreign nation involved, such a deci-
sion would necessarily be based upon a determination by the agency 
involved in a decision of this magnitude are considered and set forth fully and 
candidly, pursuant to the Congressional mandate, for the information of the executive 
and legislative branches and the public." 463 F.2d at 799. See also Aberdeen & 
Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 43 U.S.L.W. 
4844 (U.S. June 24, 1975). 
146. See text at notes 17-21 supra. 
147. Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
148. This Soviet foreign aid project in Egypt has been an ecological disaster. 
The dam has cut off the Nile's natural fertilization of the lands below the dam and 
the flow of nutrients to the sea, has hurt the fishing industry, and has caused 
problems with the fluke parasite in irrigation canals. See L. CALDWELL, IN DEFENSE 
OF EARTii 92-93 ( 1972). 
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that the international detriment outweighs the local benefit. Clearly 
such an exercise of agency discretion is appropriate from a policy 
standpoint. 
An analysis of the worldwide nature of environmental degrada-
tion demonstrates the importance of an extraterritorial interpretation 
of the impact statement requirement. No one can doubt the severity 
of the present environmental problem and the potential for dr~tic 
future consequences. Mankind is depleting important and irreplace-
able resources at an incredible and highly wasteful rate149 and is 
introducing vast quantities of toxic and nondegradable chemicals 
into the environment.150 It is well recognized that these actions will 
ultimately have worldwide effects.151 Several pollutants, such as 
DDT and radioactive wastes, have already spread throughout the 
globe and are detectable in life forms everywhere.152 In addition, 
other deleterious effects will likely result in the long run from the 
cumulative impact of man's activities. For example, the measurable 
increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide over the past few decades 
has potential for changing weather patterns worldwide.153 Similarly, 
it is possible that nitrous oxides and other atmospheric pollutants will 
ascend to the upper atmosphere and there react with the ozone layer, 
which is essential to protect terrestrial life from the sun's lethal ultra-
violet rays. rn4 The effects of ozone loss would necessarily be world-
wide. 
These examples illustrate the simple fact of the symbiotic nature 
of all aspects of the environment. A change in one element any-
where can have multiple effects throughout the whole earth system. 
As Senator Jackson has stated: "We must seek solutions to environ-
mental problems on an international level because they are inter-
national in origin and scope. The earth is a common resource, and 
cooperative effort will be necessary to protect it."155 Since man has 
not yet begun to understand the complexity of the entire system, it 
would be fallacious to presume that a distinction could presently be 
drawn between environmental impacts that are strictly local and 
those that have potential for long-range worldwide damage. The 
only prudent course is for man to minimize his direct impact on 
natural systems in whatever he does and wherever he acts. 
149. See E. GoLDSMlTII, R. ALLEN, M. ALLABY, ]. DAVOLL & s. LAWRENCE, 
BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 149-54 (1972). 
150. Id. at 91-102. 
151. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 78, 115 CONG. REc. at 29,081-82; B. WARD 
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T,he United States is one of the primary disrupters of natural 
systems in the world today. Although most of this disruption occurs 
domestically, there is potential for considerable disruption by federal 
activities abroad, 156 such as the large-scale use of defoliants in Viet-
nam and the exportation of nuclear power plants and large quanti-
ties of DDT through foreign aid programs. Due to the interrelated-
ness of all natural systems, it is in the United States' own interest 
to apply NEPA procedures, which were designed to minimize the 
environmental impacts of federal actions, to these activities abroad. 
Thus, from an environmental policy standpoint, NEPA procedures 
should be applied to federal activities anywhere in the world. 
156. "[A]s the nation with the most highly developed technology in the world, 
the United States is responsible for a major share of the adverse impacts of modem 
technology upon the quality of the world environment. Our economic development 
programs has [sic] produced major environmental impacts in the undeveloped coun-
tries, many of them deleterious." Joint House.;Senate Colloquium To Discuss a 
National Policy for the Environment, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior 
and Insular Affairs and the House Comm. 011 Science and Astronautics, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 220 (1968) (statement of R. Train, President, Conservation Foundation) 
(emphasis omitted). 
